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Abstract
This article analyses and compares President Bachelet’s successful efforts to reform the
Chilean pension system in 2008 and her failure to achieve the same objective in 2017.
The article addresses the impact of electoral promises, policy legacies, policy ideology,
presidential power, the role of the private sector, and the role that the government
coalitions had in the process of pension reform during the Bachelet administrations. We
argue that the 2008 reform was possible because of Bachelet’s personal commitment to
reform and the presence of a stable governing coalition that had the will and capacity to
legislate. In the second administration, although the policy legacies and ideology had
remained the same, the reform did not materialise due to intense conflict within
the administration and within the government coalition, as well as conflict between the
administration and the coalition. These conflicts, in turn, generated a vicious cycle
responsible for Bachelet’s declining popularity, limited political capital, and reduced sup-
port for reform. A stagnant economy further undermined these efforts. In brief, this article
argues that when assessing success and failure in pension policy reform it is important to
analyse not only policy legacies and political ideology but also the strength of the executive,
the cohesion of the governing coalition, and the country’s economic performance.
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Introduction
This article analyses and compares Michelle Bachelet’s successful efforts to reform the
Chilean pension system in 2008 and her failure to achieve the same objective in 2017.
Inspired by a similar ideology, with similar policy legacies and facing equally powerful
interest groups, Bachelet was able to obtain major pension reform during her first
administration yet failed to achieve the same goal during her second administration. Why
did this occur? Why was Bachelet able to achieve reform in one administration while
failing to do so in another? This article will answer this question by analysing the fol-
lowing: the role of the executive branch, the stability and effectiveness of the governing
coalition, the overall economic performance of the country, and the role of the pension
plan administrators.
The article begins by exploring approaches to social security and pension policy. This
section reviews some of the major historical and contemporary approaches used to
analyse social policy reform in Latin America including the pioneer works of Carmelo
Mesa-Lago and James M. Malloy, as well as current approaches elaborated by Rosanna
Castiglione, Christina Ewig, Candelaria Garay, Stephen Kay, Juliana Martinez Franzoni,
Jennifer Pribble, and Diego Sánchez Ancochea, among others.
The second section of the article provides a brief history of social security and pension
policies in Chile and the third section analyses Bachelet’s approach to governance and
the general characteristics of the first administration followed by a discussion of the
nature of Chile’s pension system and an assessment of the 2008 reform’s impact. The
fourth section analyses the nature of governance and some of the critical problems
affecting the Bachelet’s second administration. Lastly, the fifth section analyses why
President Bachelet failed to enact pension reform despite having similar demands for
reform, having made similar electoral promises, and having similar policy legacy and
ideology.
Essentially, I argue that during her first administration, President Bachelet was able to
carry out the 2008 pension reform because this was a priority for her and because of the
presence of a stable governing coalition that had the will and capacity to turn into law
some of the proposals made by the presidential commission. Thus, while the commission
provided a platform to develop legislation, the Concertación coalition provided the
legislative support required to enact the least controversial recommendations. In the
process, Bachelet was able to accomplish some of her goals, satisfy some of her con-
stituents’ demand, keep the governing coalition together, and maintain a fairly large
degree of popular support. Overall, during the first administration, presidential com-
missions and the ensuing reforms were at the centre of a virtuous cycle that generated
some reforms, satisfied some of the most pressing demands, and generated a large degree
of public support for Bachelet. Stable economic management provided the required
financial support. In the second administration, although the policy legacies and ideol-
ogy had remained basically the same and Bachelet also resorted to the formation of
commissions, the outcome was quite different. We believe that in this case the failure to
achieve pension reform was due to the intense conflict within the administration and
within the government coalition, as well as conflict between the administration and the
Borzutzky 205
coalition. A stagnant economy and the decision of the president to prioritise other
reforms undermined these attempts even further. Thus, the chaos and conflict within the
coalition and within the administration generated a vicious cycle responsible for
Bachelet’s declining popularity, limited political capital, and reduced support for
reforms.
The conclusion addresses the impact of electoral promises, policy legacies, policy
ideology, presidential power, the role of the private sector, and the role that the gov-
ernment coalitions had in the process of pension reform during the Bachelet
administrations.
Explaining the Evolution of Social Security and Pension Reform
Multiple theoretical frameworks explain the evolution of social policy across the world.
As Kwong-Leung Tang notes, share a number of common factors including economic
development, aged population [ . . . ] class conflicts, mobilisation of labour, moder-
nisation, diffusion and an open economy (Tang, 1996: 377–393). In the case of Latin
America, there is a rich analytic tradition that began with the work of Carmelo Mesa-
Lago who focused on the role of pressure groups in the initiation of social security
policies in the 1910s and 1920s in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (Mesa-Lago, 1978).
James Malloy’s analysis emphasised the role of the Brazilian state in the policy process
in the 1930s, while I argued that in the case of Chile early policies result from state
initiatives shaped by interest groups through their representatives in Congress. I also
argue that state actors in conjunction with the private sector generated the Pinochet
dictatorship’s massive pension reform. This market-oriented reform favoured the private
sector, and especially the Pension Fund Administrators (Borzutzky, 2002; Malloy,
1979).
At the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century, the
development and expansion of pension policies is rooted in economic and political
variables, as well as domestic and international factors. While some scholars focus on the
impact of Globalisation, others emphasise political determinants, including the nature of
the political systems, the structure and ideology of governing political parties, and the
role of unions and interest groups. As Jennifer Pribble writes
[P]olicy legacies, electoral competition, and party character are all important factors that
shape the nature and scope of social policy reform in contemporary Latin America. This is
not to suggest that these are the only variables that influence reform [ . . . ]. other factors,
including political institutional design, civil society mobilization, international actors, and
economic performance, also contributed to the content of social policy reform in Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela [ . . . ]. (Pribble, 2013: 173)
Pribble’s analysis focuses on the role of leftist parties, a factor also explored by other
analysts including Esping-Andersen and Evelyn Huber (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber
and Stephens, 2001). In addition to party ideology, Pribble is concerned with the internal
organisation of the parties and the connections between the party elites and the base. Her
framework also highlights how previous policies or policy legacies “shape the
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distribution of power and interests within the policy sector” (Pribble, 2013:13). Lastly,
she includes the structure of electoral competitions or the ways in which policies are
affected by political parties’ positions in a given election. The question of policy legacies
has also been explored and developed further by other analysts. Rosanna Castiglione, for
example, argues that
Social security change is the result of three combined explanatory factors. The ideological
positions of policy-makers, the patterns of distribution of governmental authority, and the
actions of non-state actors are critical in explaining social security change. The model
theorizes that the ideological positions of the core policy- makers determine the direction
and content of proposals for social security change, but cannot account for the ability of
governments to achieve their policy goals. This ability, in turn, depends on the distribution
of governmental authority and on the degree to which non-state actors opposing change can
block reform attempts. (Castiglione, 2018: 189)
In their study of Costa Rica, Martı́nez Franzoni and Sánchez Ancochea argue that
both the role of internal political elites and international actors play a central role in the
legitimation of ideas and the mapping of possible options available at any given time.
These actors and ideas, in turn, influence the specific characteristics of policies and
programs (Martı́nez and Sánchez Ancochea, 2017: 132–147).
While Christina Ewig and Stephen Kay analyse postretrenchment policies in Chile,
they argue that their conclusions apply also to Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Ewig
and Kay conclude that to understand the limits and often the failure to achieve policy
reform, it is critically important to include and understand the role of the private sector,
and specifically of those business groups that are intimately affected by the
“postretrenchment policies” or reforms carried out after the 1980’s privatisation.
In Postretrenchment politics, the strengthened position of private business interests, com-
bined with political learning legacies and lock-in effects generated by reforms, results in
incremental political change, despite of renewed efforts by left parties to address inequality.
Global capital also plays an important contextual role, and may influence post-retrenchment
politics. In post-retrenchment politics, newly reformed systems may achieve greater equity,
but they do so in a fragmented form. (Ewig and Kay, 2011: 67)
Lastly, it is important to note the analytical and empirical contributions made by
Candelaria Garay. Garay focuses on a more unconventional set of policies that have
been largely ignored by other analysts: the policies toward “the outsiders,” those who are
not part of the formal labour markets. In her study, Garay shows that incumbents
expanded social policies in response to political competition and social mobilisation
from below and that “the choice of policy models is related to the actors involved in the
negotiations around policy design, their preferences and institutional power” (Garay,
2016: 301).
Because this article deals with a successful case of reform in 2008 and an unsuc-
cessful attempt in 2017, the analysis will incorporate those variables that determined the
outcome in these two different instances. Policy legacies, electoral competition, party
ideology, executive determination, economic performance, and the strength and
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legislative capacity of the governing coalitions explain the critical reform enacted in
2008. The limited nature of the reform and its inability to curtail the power of the pension
fund administrators was determined by the private sector. On the other hand, Bachelet’s
failure to reform the pension system during her second administration can be explained
through the changes in the structure and power of the governing coalition, the lack of
executive direction, and the poor economic performance of the country at the time. In
both administrations, domestic and international policy elites played a substantial role,
and the private sector supported the growing involvement of the state to shore up pen-
sions. This reduced opposition to the system and any policies that would curtail the
economic rents of the pension fund administrators.
1924–2008: A Brief History of Social Security and Pension System
The origins of Chile’s social security policies in the 1920s resulted from state actions
represented by politicians such as President Arturo Alessandri (1920s) who saw social
security and labour policies as a way of averting social upheaval at a time when the
impact of the Russian and the Mexican revolutions was reverberating throughout Latin
America (Borzutzky, 2002). However, as Mesa-Lago demonstrates, the role of interest
groups, specifically those involved in critical economic activities, explains the dis-
articulated and fragmented growth of the system between the 1920s and 1960s. Thus,
between 1924 and 1972, Chile’s social security system grew in a haphazard form. By the
early 1970s, up to 70 per cent of the population was covered through over 600 different
funds, each with its own set of benefits and financial rules. The outcome was an
expensive and unequal social security system that provided very substantial pensions to a
few and inadequate pensions to many (Mesa-Lago, 1978). The expansion of democracy
in the mid-twentieth century facilitated the growth of the system as interest groups
exercised power through labour organisations and elected representatives, especially
left-wing parties (Pribble, 2013).
However, this evolutionary policy process, in which electoral competition, political
parties’ ideologies, and policy legacies were essential elements, came to an abrupt end
with the brutal 1973 military coup that destroyed both Chilean democracy and the
existing social policies. What had taken about 50 years to build was quickly dis-
assembled and the existing funds were replaced in 1981 with a market-oriented reform
inspired by the economic ideas of Milton Friedman and the political ideas of James
Buchanan (McLean, 2017). Undoubtedly, the old policy legacies were abandoned. The
new ones resulted from a radically different ideological approach to policymaking and a
new political system.
The Privately Administered Pension System, High
Administrative Charges, Low and Unequal Pensions,
High Fiscal Cost, and the Need for Reform
The fully funded (FF), defined-contribution (DC) pension system imposed by the
Pinochet dictatorship in 1981 had many significant outcomes. Specifically, it transferred
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the administration of the public funds to the private sector; it forced all new workers to
join one of the privately owned pension funds; and it eliminated the employer’s con-
tribution to the system, creating a for-profit, compulsory, privately administered pension
system. The reform eliminated the pre-existing publicly administered funds, or cajas de
prevision, except for those held by the military and the police; and it eliminated the
obligation of the employers to contribute to the retirement funds of their employees.
Over thirty-seven years of data on the impact of privatisation support the following
conclusions: it is expensive; it concentrates income in the Administradoras de Fondos de
Pensiones (AFPs) or Pension Fund Managers; it generates huge profits for the AFPs; it is
exclusionary; and it discriminates against women as well as part-time and independent
workers (Hyde and Borzutzky, 2016). This section will discuss these five outcomes.
Since the 1981 reform, the pension funds have been managed by the AFPs, private
entities created with the sole purpose of administering pension funds. The AFPs, in turn,
charge a fee for the administration of the funds. As this was inspired by a “market
philosophy,” the AFPs’ administrative charges remained unregulated to induce com-
petition and supposedly and eventually reduce charges (Piñera, 1996; Rodrı́guez, 1999).
However, after thirty-seven years, the administrative costs are still very high and have
had a negative impact on the capacity of the affiliates to accumulate enough money for
retirement. A World Bank report estimated that the AFPs retain a staggering amount of
money: between a quarter and a third of workers’ contributions in the form of com-
missions, insurance, and other administrative fees. Thus, the evidence of excessive
charging is substantial, as pension fund managers have imposed charges of between 25
and 36 per cent of the contribution or a quarter and a third of worker’s retirement savings.
As a result, the profitability of the companies between 2000 and 2005 was estimated to
be over 50 per cent (Gill et al., 2005).
The question of high charges and profits is compounded by the lack of competition
and the fact that over time the number of AFPs has been reduced from twelve to six and
that the system does not allow for banks or other financial entities to participate in the
provision of pensions. The AFPs administrative charges were 89 per cent more expen-
sive than banks or private stockbrokers’ charges in 1999 (Valdés, 1999). A 2008,
comparative study of administrative charges shows that those affiliated to a Chilean
AFPs pay more than their counterparts in other privately administered systems such as
Australia and Sweden and that charges for other forms of financial services are much
lower (Hyde and Borzutzky, 2016; Tapia and Yermo, 2008). Manuel Riesco, an econ-
omist with the National Center for Alternative Development Studies, argues, “The
money they collect from salary deductions is more than twice as much as they pay out in
pensions. That’s a huge surplus they will never give back” (cited in Bonefoy, 2016).
American firms (Principal Financial Group, Prudential Financial, and MetLife) own
three of the six AFPs and regional firms (BTG Pactual from Brazil and Grupo Sura, a
Colombian conglomerate) manage two (Svaluto Moreolo, 2017). According to the
Fundación Sol, the AFPs profits for 2017 amounted to US$530 million dollars (No Mas
AFPs, 2017).
As mentioned, the system has also led to a massive concentration of capital in the
hands of the AFPs. By the end of 2005, the accumulated capital in pension funds
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amounted to 59.4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Mesa-Lago, 2008: 133). It
increased to 63.7 per cent of GDP in 2010, and by 2016, the funds controlled by the six
AFPs were equal to about 71 per cent of Chile’s GDP (Borgen Project, 2016). As
Borzutzky and Hyde note, “It is almost as if the military dictatorship gave the AFPs a
license to print money and to control a large per cent of Chile’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) (Borzutzky and Hyde, 2015: 7).
Regarding investments and performance, the administrators have ample discretion in
the management of their portfolios. Nevertheless, contrary to what the framers of the
system argued, more freedom has not translated into more benefits for the affiliates
because liberty has not incentivised competition nor has it maximised returns to affiliates
(Piñera, 1996). In fact, the evidence around net returns – which are a function of
investment returns and management charges – suggests that the performance of the AFPs
during the first two decades was not very impressive. According to Leiva, “once the
commissions and fees are factored in the rate of return is more than halved from what has
been reported by the AFPs and conservative pundits” (Leiva, 2016: 7). Leiva argues also
that the real rate of return amounts to 5 per cent annually (Leiva, 2016: 7). Studies by
Acuňa and Kay arrived at similar conclusions and show that investment performance has
declined steadily, endangering the well-being of retirees and forcing the state to increase
its role. The 2017 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Pension Report shows great variability in the returns as it estimates that for 2015–2016
the rate of return was of only 1.5 per cent while the previous year it had been of 8.1 per
cent (OECD, 2017: 159).
The pension benefits generated by the FF, DC system are insufficient and have had a
negative impact on income distribution. Regarding distribution, Reyes and Pino have
shown that the retirement Gini Index is higher than the income Gini Index. The authors
argue, “the distribution of retirement income is much more unequal than the distribution
of active life income for the same cohort [ . . . ]. The same can be said for the level of
minimum pension guaranteed by the state” (Reyes and Pino, 2005: 1). Considering how
unequal Chile is, this is a major issue.
Despite the promises made by its framers, the FF, DC system is responsible for a
substantial fiscal burden because of the state’s obligation to pay for minimum and
welfare pensions. The minimum pension operates when an AFP affiliate has not been
able to accumulate savings that are large enough to obtain a pension above the mandated
minimum. In practice, by 2008, due to labour market issues, evasion, low level of
mandatory contributions, and high administrative charges, only 25 per cent of those with
an AFP account were able to generate savings large enough to obtain a pension above the
state-designated minimum. Another 25 per cent was unable to generate such assets but
had paid enough contributions to qualify for the means-tested government pension.
Therefore, around 50 per cent of plan participants failed to meet either condition and
were condemned to poverty after retirement, reinforcing and expanding the large income
inequities that exist among active workers (Borzutzky and Hyde, 2015: 8). As noted by
Arenas de Mesa, the fiscal burden averaged 5.7 per cent of GDP between 1981 and 1998.
Pension spending amounted to 42 per cent of all social spending and 27 per cent of the
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total government spending. The projected cost was of about 3.2 per cent of GDP (Arenas
de Mesa, 2010: 37).
In brief, in 2008, pension reform was needed because about 50 per cent of the pop-
ulation was excluded from the system, and a large portion of those who contributed were
not able to save enough to obtain a minimum pension, which forced the state to provide a
minimum pension of about US$200 per month. Moreover, women’s pensions were
insufficient and lower than men’s pensions because women live longer than men; their
salaries are on average 18 per cent lower than the salary of their male counterparts; and
because child-rearing and other family responsibilities force women to take time off
from the job and from contributing to their pensions. The end result is significantly
smaller pensions because a smaller amount of money has to be distributed over a longer
period of time, which contributes to increasing poverty among the elderly, especially
older women (Mesa-Lago, 2008: 60); it is important to note that the wage gap increased
between 2002 and 2007. OECD data show that poverty among those over seventy years
old stands at 19.3 per cent (OECD, 2015).
Since the transition to democratically elected regimes in 1990, the Concertación
coalition administrations only made marginal modifications to the system. The marginal
changes were essentially geared to incentivise private savings and liberalise the
investments managed by the AFPs. Undoubtedly, policy legacies and the role of the
private administrators determined the nature and scope of these limited reforms, but by
2008, the system was in need of major reforms. The next section discusses Bachelet’s
governance style followed by an analysis of the 2008 Reform.
Michelle Bachelet’s First Administration (2006–2010): Governance and the
2018 Pension Reform
As Weeks illustrates, during her first administration President Bachelet developed a
consensual approach designed to overcome existing institutional constraints and “to
avoid returning to the conflictive past that had ripped Chilean democracy apart in 1973”
(Weeks, 2010a: 4). Among those constraints was a 2005 constitutional amendment that
had shortened the presidential term from six to four years, and the binomial electoral
system that since 1990 has frustrated a large part of the electorate by favouring the
political right. Frustration with the system and with the failure of the Concertación – the
governing coalition that had been in power since the end of the dictatorship – to resolve
major inequities and include critical social actors in its coalition, has resulted in massive
street protest and strikes which besieged the administration in 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Those protesting included workers demanding labour rights and better wages; indi-
genous groups demanding environmental protections and land rights; students
demanding a better and more equitable educational system; as well as Santiaguinos
demanding a better transit system. Many of those protesting were an integral part of the
governing coalition, yet after fifteen years in power, their needs had not been met by its
policies, evidence of an erosion in the Concertación’s power, and ability to aggregate
interests. The Concertación, which had been formed to defeat General Pinochet’s can-
didate in the 1989 elections, assumed an anti-Pinochet consensus that had eroded as
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Pinochet’s power and influence declined. The country’s problems required solutions
around which a new consensus could not be easily formed (Weeks, 2010a).
To seek and get consensual solutions, Bachelet resorted to the formation of com-
missions that included a large number of political, social, and religious actors and
experts. The work of these commissions would generally conclude with massive reports
that thoroughly analysed the issue and provided recommendations. The recommenda-
tions, in turn, went to Cabinet members who transformed them into bills geared not
necessarily to fully solve the problem, but do what was politically possible, given the
need to compromise with opposition. The result was partial change, which made some
happy and left others with unmet needs and ready to take to the streets to demand change.
As Weeks argues, governing through commissions allowed Bachelet to project an image
of inclusiveness, but they also created new problems because some failed to provide
solutions, fuelling more resentment and discontent (Weeks, 2010a: 8, 9). While in some
cases the commissions turned out to be a double-edged sword due to their unwieldy
nature and the gap between the commissions’ recommendations and the resulting leg-
islation, yet overall they provided Bachelet with political support by allowing the
administration to achieve gradual change in several areas. In the area of pensions, this
approach produced a significant, but partial reform that improved pensions for lower
income groups and women, but did not affect the rent-seeking behaviour of the pension
fund administrators. Nor did this partial reform reduce the burden of the state, which
effectively has supported the private pension system and the earnings of their fund
owners.
In analysing the success of this reform, it is important to note that this had been a
major campaign issue and that Bachelet had promised pension reform. Shortly after her
inauguration, Bachelet charged The Marcel Commission with studying the system and
proposing reforms. The Commission proposed these reforms in a report presented to
President Bachelet in July 2006. The Marcel Commission proposed, among other sug-
gestions, to move towards the universalisation of benefits, augment the pension system’s
replacement ratio, eliminate old age poverty, and create a system that could sustain these
goals over time. On receiving the report, Bachelet created a Ministerial Committee
headed by the Labour Minister Andrade. This committee was charged with drafting and
submitting a pension reform bill to congress. In January 2008, after months of negoti-
ations between the government and the political opposition, the Chilean Congress
approved some (but not all) of the most important proposals made by the Marcel
Commission. The most important reforms are detailed below.
To supplement the deficiencies of the private system, the 2008 reform guarantees a
Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS) to all Chileans over sixty-five years old who had never
contributed to the pension system. The PBS was designed to reduce old age poverty by
providing a pension to low income workers who are unable to save enough or to save at
all in the private system. The basic pension is about US$160 per month (Gobierno de
Chile, 2017). The state also provides a supplementary contribution to those who have
insufficient or low-density contributions, to guarantee a pension of about US$400. This
benefit provides pensions to about 60 per cent of those in the lowest income groups
(Gobierno de Chile, Comisión Marcel, Informe, 2006–2007). Typically, workers who
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have been in and out of the labour market, including temporary and independent workers
as well as women, have benefited from this modality. It is estimated that women receive
about 60 per cent of the solidarity pensions. The government also provides a Basic
Invalidity Pension to those covered by the PBS.
One of the most novel and interesting aspects of the 2008 reform is a provision that
supports women’s pensions. To compensate for time taken off work due to childbirth and
child-rearing, women’s pension funds are supplemented by the Chilean State at the rate
of eighteen months of contributions per child. The government contribution is based on a
minimum salary, and while the monies are not deposited into the account until the
woman turns sixty-five, they generate interest from the moment the child is born.
Moreover, because women do not use the invalidity and survival pensions as much as
men do, the part of the deposit that is not used for these items is deposited directly into
the woman’s account. As noted in the Marcel Commission Report, the goal was to
equalise male and female pensions because as citizens, women are entitled to the same
pension benefits as men, and because is the obligation of the state to correct the
inequities generated by the market and by socio-economic norms (Gobierno de Chile,
Comisión Marcel, Informe, 2006–2007: 118–120).
A major failure of the private system was its inability to integrate independent or self-
employed workers. To include these workers in the system, the 2008 legislation estab-
lished that they would be enrolled in the AFPs through a yearly “bidding system.” In
practice, the government assembles the independent workers who wish to enrol into
“packets,” and the AFPs are given the opportunity to offer bids, which specify com-
missions and other administrative costs. Once an AFP obtains a “packet” of insured, it
cannot increase the commissions for at least eighteen months (Gobierno de Chile, Law
20.255, 2008).
The Bachelet administration was also interested in expanding the pension system.
To incentivise young workers’ contributions, the government offers to subsidise the
pensions of those between 18 and 35 years of age with an income that is less than
1.5 times the minimum salary. The law is also designed to encourage additional
contributions by middle-income groups through the creation of a system of volun-
tary savings (Ahorro Previsional Voluntario). The state incentivises savings by
granting tax benefits and contributing the equivalent of 15 per cent of the capital
accumulated in the savings account. The reform also introduces investment flexi-
bility by allowing the AFPs to expand investments abroad from 30 per cent to 80 per
cent within 3 years.
It is clear that the 2008 legislation benefits those in the lower income groups as the
new PBS provides pensions to about 1.2 million people. A study shows that
One significant program impact is that respondents living in a poor household with someone
age 65þ are more likely than others to have heard of the PBS for the elderly. We find a
significant positive impact of the reform among the targeted poor having an older household
member where respondents indicate receiving an annual US$105 from PASIS/PBS trans-
fers. There is little evidence of public benefits crowding-out private transfers. (Berhamn
et al., 2011: 12)
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The 2008 reform was the most important socio-economic accomplishment of the first
Bachelet administration, and it has had positive effects on equity by incentivising the
expansion of coverage, creating the PBS, and supporting women’s pensions. As Hyde
and Borzutzky note,
The most critical impact of the 2008 reform has been the introduction for the first time since
1980 of a social component into the pension system through the addition of the Solidarity
Pillar, or state financed pillar which supports the expansion of pensions to lower income
groups, young workers and women. Moreover, the incorporation of new workers through a
system of bids seems to have led to a reduction in the administrative costs for that group of
workers and the strengthening of the voluntary savings component, or third pillar of the
system, fostering an increase in voluntary savings. (Hyde and Borzutzky, 2016: 67)
The new benefits cost an additional 0.5% of GDP in the first few years, rising to about
1% of GDP after phase-in by 2025 (Shelton, 2012: 4). Estimates made by the Marcel
Commission and by Carmelo Mesa-Lago show a reduction of transition costs because of
the 2008 reform.
In conclusion, this reform illustrates the effects and impacts of Bachelet’s consensual
approach and the Concertación’s determination to continue applying the market eco-
nomic model inherited from the Pinochet regime, while also trying to deal with the most
glaring inequities produced by the market. As a result, policy legacies prevailed because
the private pension system remained unchanged, but important reforms were made
within the context of the existing policies. Because of the democratic nature of the
system and the ideology of the governing coalition, the state intervened to reduce the
poverty and inequities created by the model while failing to address the reasons for those
inequities, due to either political limitations or unwillingness to alter a convenient status
quo. Additionally, because the economy was growing at a healthy rate due to the high
price of copper and China’s demand for Chile’s main export, the resources to finance the
reform were available and the fiscal policy remained stable.
The Commissions’ recommendations were to make the pension insurance market
more competitive. The Commission also proposed that the administrative costs be
lowered by allowing banks to enter the pension business or by creating a state-managed
AFP. The Senate rejected these recommendations. As a result, the reform did not change
the AFPs monopoly over the pension system nor did it have an impact on the admin-
istrative charges imposed by the AFPs onto its affiliates. Moreover, the reform did not
change the commissions charged by the AFPs nor did it force the employers to contribute
to their employees’ pension system. The new policy did not solve the question of the
replacement rate because the charge-structure to the affiliates/members/workers was not
touched by the reforms, and contributions were not increased. In fact, what the reform
did was to support and encourage the continuation of “rent seeking” behaviour by the
AFPs because the state became the default insurer for those who cannot accumulate
enough to have a minimum pension (Hyde and Borzutzky, 2016a). As a result, the
impact of the business sector in defining the scope and contour of the reform was
substantial, generating the foundations for demands for more reforms by the time
President Bachelet returned to power in 2014. Additionally, dissatisfaction had for the
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first time generated a social movement, the NoþAFP movement, which was able to call
for large demonstrations against the pension system. As Bachelet returned to power in
2014, the time seemed ripe to implement substantial reforms.
Making Policies in the Second Bachelet Administration (2014–2018): Paralysis
and Chaos
The Concertación is often considered the most successful political coalition in Latin
America because it held power from 1990 until 2009. However, the defeat of the former
President Eduardo Frei and the election of Sebastián Piňera in the 2009 produced a crisis
that led to the changing of the coalition’s name and program. Before the 2013 presi-
dential and congressional elections, the old Concertación became the Nueva Mayorı́a
(NM).
The NM was also a coalition – even if its leaders did not call it that – of seven centre–
left parties, which included the Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties, the Partido
por la Democracia (PPD), the Communist Party, and the Radical Party, among others.
Since its inception, uncertainty about the nature of the NM’s program was the core
problem for the coalition members and for the newly re-elected President Bachelet.
While the NM leaders could agree on the common goal of supporting Bachelet’s pres-
idential bid and succeeded in getting her elected, they could not forge a coherent pro-
gram of policies nor could they resolve major differences among key coalition members
such as the Christian Democratic and the Communist Parties. It is important to note that
the coalition survived until the beginning of the 2017 presidential campaign when its
members decided to nominate three different presidential candidates: Carolina Goic for
the Christian Democratic Party, Alejandro Guillier for the Fuerza de la Mayorı́a, and
Beatriz Sanchez for the Frente Amplio.
It is noteworthy that Bachelet’s 2013 campaign and electoral success was not pre-
mised on the accomplishments of her first administration, or the success of the other
Concertación governments, because the NM leaders lacked confidence in the popularity
of the old coalition and its past accomplishments. However, the NM leaders could only
define a short-term purpose but not a coherent ideology. According to Ignacio Walker, a
former NM president, the “Nueva Mayorı́a is a political and programmatic agreement
built to support President Michelle Bachelet’s government and its program” (Walker,
2018). Asked why he could not call the NM a coalition, Walker answered that its mission
was to support the presidential program that he was not sure if the NM was replacing the
Concertación and that he would not be able to provide an assessment about the NM’s
future until 2018 (El Mercurio, Enero 6 2014). As we now know, the NM barely survived
until the beginning of the 2017 presidential campaign and it is now defunct.
The NM was fraught with problems from the very beginning. By the end of 2014, its
leaders were trying to figure out how to deal with their lack of unity, their lack of
common goals, the fraught relationships with the administration, and their approach to
the administration’s policies. These fractious relationships endangered the popularity of
the government and of the president (Ganora and Labra, 2014). By late 2015, the crisis
expanded as large sectors of society once again took to the streets because they felt
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excluded from the political process and dissatisfied with the administration’s inability to
solve their problems. In the words of Alejandro Navarro, the NM parties had failed to
incorporate the citizens into the political process and “the most valuable political capital
of the Nueva Mayorı́a is still Bachelet even with a 24% [support]” (Ruiz, 2015).
The intra-coalition conflict resulted from the nature of the organisation and the dis-
content held by some with the long process of democratic transition and the failure of the
Concertación governments to achieve a better distribution of income. Internally, as noted
by Walker, “Maybe there was not, during the formation of the Nueva Mayorı́a (2010–
2013) a profound debate over the past, present and future of the center-left.” He adds,
What we had in 2013 and 2014 was a politico-electoral avalanche personified by Michelle
Bachelet [ . . . ] More than a government program [ . . . ]. it was she, Michelle Bachelet the
one who managed to interpret what the electorate and the people wanted.(Walker, 2018:
103)
In this context, Bachelet had to respond to demands for substantial reforms, including
the replacement of General Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution, as well as demands for
changes in the electoral and educational systems, the tax structure, and the pension
system. To successfully legislate, Bachelet needed the NM to adhere to a common
agenda and joint congressional action, but because the NM leaders could not even
acknowledge that they were part of a coalition, they certainly could not function like.
Consequently, even though the NM had a partial majority in Congress, the legislative
process was lengthy, disjointed, and conflict-ridden.
However, the NM leaders were not the only ones responsible for the chaos. Chaos
came also from within the administration and further dramatised by accusations of
corrupt behaviour within both Bachelet’s cabinet and her family. These problems were
exacerbated by the economic slowdown. The main political and economic problems
experienced by the administration are analysed below.
Structural Reforms: Success and Cost
The need for structural reforms that would complete the endless transition to democracy
has been a recurrent theme in Chilean politics. When and how the transition ended, or if
the transition had even ended, has been the subject of constant analysis and discussion.
Most of the post-Pinochet administrations had argued that they completed the transition
while also telling Chileans that there were many things still to do in the future. Para-
phrasing Greg Weeks, we have heard that “the transition is dead, long live the transi-
tion”(Weeks, 2010b: Chapter 3). While the slow pace of change could be explained, in
the past, by Pinochet’s effect on the society, the presence of unelected members of
Congress, or the power of the military, those problems had been largely solved by 2014.
By 2015, politicians had to confront not only the incomplete transition but also demands
for deeper economic and political reforms.
Candidate Bachelet obtained 62.1 per cent of the vote in 2013 because she promised
thorough reforms during her campaign. However, her power was weakened by the fact
that she got fewer votes than any of her predecessors due to the low voter turnout – 42 per
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cent – in the second round. In addition, her capacity to govern was undermined by the
fact that the NM obtained 50.63 per cent of the vote in the Senate and 47.71 per cent in
the Chamber of Deputies (Siavelis, 2016: 59). In practice, Bachelet was unable to hold
her “coalition” together. Her inability to pass the promised reforms became a major
challenge for an administration that often looked unprepared and unprofessional. In the
words of Peter Siavelis,
She has had to build majorities to initiate reform, holding together her potentially fractious
Nueva Mayorı́a coalition, which included parties ranging from the centrist Christian Dem-
ocrats to the far Left Communists, as well as four deputies from the powerful student
movement. Not only there were more parties than during the Concertación years, but the
power of the left had increased, making for potentially more opposition from the right.
(Siavelis, 2016: 39)
Moreover, attempts to reform (and actual reforms) only deepened the existing divi-
sions. For instance, early in her administration, Bachelet proposed a major educational
reform. This immediately produced a coalition crisis due to disagreements about the
extent of free education. This was followed by the tax reform that became very unpop-
ular and within a few months, more people disapproved of the tax reform than approved
of it. As Georgina Waylen asserts, Bachelet
was elected again in 2013 on a platform that promised ambitious reforms in three major
areas: tax, education and the constitution [ . . . ] and although the beginning of her second
presidency saw some significant reforms being passed, it also faced some serious crises and
setbacks by the end of her first year in office. (Waylen, 2016: 1)
Consequently, while Bachelet managed to get Congressional approval for both the
educational and tax reforms, the cost associated with the passage and implementation
of these reforms prevented her from proposing the much promised constitutional reform
and delayed the submission of pension bills to Congress until the last months of the
administration.
Corruption
After having used most of her political capital in the passage of the education and tax
reforms, a weakened Bachelet had to deal with multiple accusations of corruption by
some of her closest aides and family members. At first, she refused to deal with the
corruption accusations made against some of her closest political allies. But, by May
2015, she asked for the resignation of the entire Cabinet. In the aftermath of the mass
resignation, several ministers were replaced including her two closest associates: the
Interior Minister, Rodrigo Peňailillo, and Finance Minister, Alberto Arenas de Mesa.
While the accusations against them were not been fully verified, the administration’s
prestige and popular support were seriously affected (La Tercera, 2015).
The Caso Caval, or nueragate, the corruption scandal involving Bachelet’s daughter-
in-law, had a substantial impact on her popularity and ability to govern. The case
involves a US$10 million loan to Natalia Compagnon, Bachelet’s daughter-in-law, from
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the Banco de Chile the day after the presidential election. While the loan itself was not
illegal, the money was used by Mrs. Compagnon and her associates to buy real estate in
an area where the property classification was scheduled to change from rural to urban,
producing a major increase in property values. Bachelet’s decision to wait almost a year
to speak about the case damaged her popularity and her ability to govern (Vargas, 2016).
As for the case, in July of 2018, Compagnon was found to have violated tax laws, a
decision confirmed by the Supreme Court in October 2018. Compagnon is expected to
serve a prison sentence of 541 days and repay about US$32,000 (Tele13, 2016).
It is also important to note that there have also been accusations of corrupt behaviour
on the part of members of Chile Vamos, the right-wing coalition, which have contributed
to the discrediting of Chile’s entire political class. According to a February 2017 Adi-
mark Poll, only 11 per cent of Chileans approved of the work done by the Senate, and
only 9 per cent approved of the work done by the members of Chamber of Deputies. The
work of the NM was approved by 17 per cent of Chileans and support for Chile Vamos
reached 28 per cent (Adimark, 2017a). By June 2017, approval for the Senate had
dropped to 10 per cent while approval for the Chamber of Deputies dropped to 8 per cent;
18 per cent approved of the NM (Adimark, 2017b).
Stagnant Economy
Lastly, a stagnant economy and a declining GDP (lasting until mid-2017) reinforced a
sense of inefficiency and damaged the administration’s popularity. While Chile’s GDP
grew at 5.5 per cent in 2012, the rate of growth declined to 4.0 per cent in 2013, 1.8 per
cent in 2014, 2.3 per cent in 2015, and 1.7 per cent in 2016 (Knoema, 2018). The sluggish
economic performance can be attributed to a variety of international and domestic
factors. Internationally, the decline in copper prices linked to the decline in Chinese
demand for copper substantially affected economic performance and GDP growth.
However, many Chileans perceived the GDP decline because of the administration’s
poor economic management and the negative impact of the tax reform. In May 2015,
Rodrigo Valdés replaced Arenas de Mesa who had structured the tax law. While Valdés
was able to improve relations with the business class, economic performance continued
to lag as GDP growth for 2017 was only 1.4 per cent (The Economist, 2018). While GDP
growth bounced back in the last quarter of 2017, the damage was already done as
economic stagnation and lack of confidence in the administration’s economic man-
agement negatively impinged on the president’s popularity.
During her first term, Bachelet’s charisma or “su habilidad para llegar a la gente,”
the presence of efficient economic and financial policymakers and a unified coalition
capable of making some policy decisions allowed her to not only govern efficiently but
also finish her term with an unprecedented amount of popular support. On the other hand,
during her second administration, the coalition’s inability to function, the corruption
cases, and the stagnant economy resulted in a massive decline in popular support. In fact,
Bachelet saw her popularity decline to 24 per cent by the end of 2015 and to about 19 per
cent by mid-2016. By February 2017 had risen to 23 per cent and by August to about 30
per cent according to Adimark surveys According to the same survey, the government’s
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approval rate was only 21 per cent (Adimark, 2017a, 2017b). The very low approval
rates further limited Bachelet’s room to manoeuvre and her ability to fulfil the expec-
tations of her supporters, including the promised pension reform. The failed attempt to
reform the pension system is discussed next.
The Pension System in 2014: The Need for Further Reform
By 2014, 9.7 million Chileans were registered in one of the six AFPs, but only 4.9
million of those were active contributors and the AFPs had provided pensions to 998,457
retirees with an average pension of about US$400 monthly. Calls for reforming the
system increased during the presidential campaign. This was due to the insufficiency of
the pensions as reflected in the low replacement ratios; the increased fiscal costs
resulting from the 2008 reform’ and the predatory behaviour of the AFPs.
Regarding replacement ratios, Borzutzky and Hyde affirm that
Our assessment of income replacement here relies on a range of ratios. Thus, today replace-
ment rates range from 11% to 55% of the wages for men and from 8% to 40% for women.
The variability or range is determined by the number of years of active contributions and the
consistency – or density of contributions made into the savings account. In practice, a
woman who had a full active life and never missed a month of deposit will get a pension
equal to 40% of her wages, and a man in the same circumstances will get a pension equal to
55% of his wages. The data also shows that on average men make deposits for about 25
years out of a 45 year working life while women register about 15 years of deposits out of 35
year work life. As a result, the replacement rate for women is a lot smaller. (Hyde and
Borzutzky, 2016: 68)
The Pension White Book issued by the Piňera administration estimated that the
replacement ratio for over 50 per cent of the retirees was less than 48 per cent and that
half of the retirees had pensions that are even lower (Gobierno de Chile, Libro Blanco,
n.d.). Moreover, a study done by the Superintendencia de Pensiones showed that for
those who retired between January 2012 and May 2013, after having contributed for
more than 30 years, the replacement rate was 54 per cent on average (66 per cent for men
and 42 per cent for women). Lastly, The Bravo Commission estimated even lower
replacement rates: 48 per cent for men and 24 per cent for women (Gobierno de Chile,
Presidential Advisory Commission or Comisión Bravo, 2015). By comparison, average
replacement rates in OECD countries amount to 65.8 per cent (Jimeno, 2015).
By 2014, fiscal costs were estimated to be US$1,621 million per year. A sizeable
portion of this money was used to subsidise the pensions of women in the poorest 60
per cent of the population (Jimeno, 2014). Thus, as noted above, the expansion of
coverage resulting from the 2008 reform was paid by the state. It did nothing to
increase the value of the pensions provided by the AFPs and did not reduce the gains or
ability to accumulate the AFP’s capital. As a result, by 2016, the total savings accu-
mulated in the hands of the pension fund administrators amounted to about 71 per cent
of the country’s GDP; they had collected US$766 million in management charges
(Hyde and Borzutzky, 2016: 68).
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In brief, the failure to increase the value of pensions and the belief that the AFPs were
receiving excessive rents generated new demands for pension reform. Much like in the
past, Bachelet resorted to the formation of a commission of experts, the Bravo Com-
mission, but the result was not a reform but rather intense infighting both within the
governing coalition and between the administration and the political parties of both the
left and right.
The Comisión Presidencial de Pensiones or Bravo Commission
Facing popular dissatisfaction with the entire pension system, and especially with the
low value of pensions (a survey conducted by the Bravo Commission showed that over
70 per cent of those interviewed did not approve of the current system), Bachelet formed
the Pension System Advisory Presidential Commission), known as the Bravo Com-
mission and led by economist David Bravo. Twenty-three national and international
experts formed the commission and it received feedback from another seventy-eight
experts. The Commission’s goal was to solve two interconnected problems: the insuf-
ficiency of pensions and the high administrative costs (Gobierno de Chile, Comisión
Bravo, 2015).
Commission members worked intensely on the question of replacement rates, con-
cluding that 50 per cent of those who retired between 2007 and 2014, including those
who receive the PBS, received monthly benefits of about US$150, or about 40 per cent of
the minimum wage. Additionally, during the same period, female pensions were about
half of those received by their male counterparts.
They also agreed that 50 percent of retirees received benefits that, at most, were equal to 34
percent of their average last ten years wages. For those retiring with the supplementary
solidarity benefit (APS), the median benefit was $84.298 for women and $107.073 for men.
(Bertranou, 2016: 7 and 8)
Of the total population employed, 69.3 per cent had contributed to an AFP. However,
contribution density was below 50 per cent for the population affiliated to the pension
system (Bertranou, 2016: 7 and 8; Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, 2016). The commission
members also estimated that,
Pensioners with high contribution densities showed a median replacement rate reaching 46
per cent; while those with low density achieved only 4 percent. There were also significant
differences by gender. The median replacement rate for men was 48 percent, while for
women it was only 24 percent. The subsidiary role of the state through the tax-financed
supplementary pension benefit APS, significantly increased the median RR [replacement
rate] to 45 percent for all pensioners; 60 percent for men and 31 percent for women;
highlighting the important role of the state. (Bertranou, 2016: 7 and 8)
According to the majority of the commission members, the low replacement ratio
resulted from several factors including insufficient contributions, high administrative
charges, and the low retirement age, especially for women. Because the employees’
contribution amounts to only 10 per cent of the wages and the employer does not
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contribute to the pension fund, the commission recommended an increase in the contri-
bution of at least 5 per cent to be paid partly, or totally, by the employer. Regarding
retirement age, the Commission estimated that increasing women’s retirement age from
60 to 65 could increase their pensions by 40 per cent (Gobierno de Chile, Bravo Com-
mission: 121–123). As a result, it recommended that the retirement age for men and
women increase to sixty-seven over a ten-year period. It also recommending providing
additional incentives to those who want to work past the retirement age (Gobierno de
Chile, Bravo Commission: 4–18).
Because excessive AFP charges are also responsible for the low replacement ratio, the
Bravo Commission, much like the 2008 Marcel Commission, recommended the entrance
of banks and other financial institutions into the pension fund administration business to
incentivise competition and reduce costs. Both commissions also recommended the
establishment of a state-owned AFP and of not-for-profit administrators to increase
competitiveness and lower costs.
The reaction to some of these recommendations was loud and clear. The creation of a
state-owned AFP generated intense opposition from the private operators who argued
that it was going to be poorly managed; that it could not generate returns; that the funds
were going to be used for political purposes; and that it would require state subsidies. The
AFP’s managers also opposed the entrance of banks or other financial institutions into
the pension business as they could bring undesired competition. Not surprisingly,
increasing contributions and postponing the retirement age were the AFP representa-
tives’ favourite solutions because they would increase their profits and reduced their
responsibility. Most administrators agreed that the 10-per cent contribution had to be
increased to 13 or 15 per cent but could not agree if the extra 5 per cent should go to a
common fund or to the individual account. To placate public opinion, the administrators
proposed that if retirement age was postponed, the AFP would not charge management
fees for the years worked beyond the legal minimum.
Because the 1981 law was premised on the notion of individual responsibility and
“free market,” Chilean employers do not contribute to the retirement of their employees
and contribute only 1.26 per cent of the taxable wage to finance the Disability Fund. In
fact, according to the International Federation of Pension Fund Administrators, Chilean
employers make the lowest contribution to their employees’ retirement among all
countries with FF, DC system. Employers’ contributions range from 2.8 per cent in
Bulgaria to 12 per cent in Colombia. Chilean employers fare even better when compared
with other OECD countries, because the average contributions in those countries are in
the 20 per cent range. It should come as no surprise that both the business community and
right-wing analysts argued that increases in the wage tax paid by the employer would
have a negative effect on wages and employment (El Mercurio, 2014).
The Commission concluded its work in September 2015 and provided Bachelet with a
detailed report of Chile’s pension system. While the commissioners could agree on the
problems affecting the system, they had different opinions about the potential solutions.
According to commission member Fabio Bertranou, there were diverse views regarding
the preservation of the status quo. Thus, while Proposal ‘A’ called for increasing the
contributions to augment the individual savings accounts, Proposal ‘B’ called for a three-
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tier mixed system that included a social insurance component. Bertranou notes that
proposal A was supported by twelve commissioners and proposal B by eleven com-
missioners (Bertranou, 2016: 7 and 8).
In brief, even though the commission members disagreed on the nature of the changes
needed, they did produce valuable recommendations to strengthen and augment the
solidarity component of the program and to strengthen the contributory pillar. They also
agreed on measures to increase savings, to increase the retirement age, to reduce risks
and benefit uncertainty, to reduce the gender gap, and to increase competition in the AFP
market, among others (Gobierno de Chile, Bravo Commission: 22–27).
On receiving the report, President Bachelet promised to create a Ministerial Com-
mittee to study the recommendations and draft legislation. However, she delayed
forming the committee until March 2016, and it was not until August 2016, in the
aftermath of a massive march organised by the NoþAFPs movement, that Bachelet
spoke about the issue calling for a national pact to reform and improve pensions
(Gobierno de Chile, March 2016, Crea comite.). The president said that the promised bill
would augment the contribution to 15 per cent of the salary with the additional 5 per cent
paid by the employer and deposited into a common fund dedicated to increasing the
value of the lowest pensions. Measures to regulate the commissions charged by the AFPs
and to strengthen the solidarity pillar were also promised (Cárcamo, 2016). However, the
government’s plan to introduce a bill to Congress did not materialise because of conflicts
about the additional contribution, the retirement age, and the administrative charges,
among others. The government explained the delays as resulting from technical issues. It
is clear that governmental paralysis intensified demands for more radical reforms
emerging from the NoþAFPs movement (Cárcamo, 2016).
The NoþAFPs Movement
In the complex history of social security and pension reform, we do not often see the
formation of a social movement created with the exclusive purpose of obtaining pension
reform, which is the goal of the NoþAFPs movement.
While the NoþAFPs movement has yet to achieve its goals, it might be quite
exceptional because of its very specific mission: to replace the FF system for a publicly
funded Pay as You Go (PAYG) system financed with contributions from the employers,
employees, and the state, and administered by an independent public body similar to
Chile’s Central Bank. It also proposes replacing the DC system with a defined benefit
system that provides “decent pensions” to all Chileans and transferring the monies
accumulated in the current savings accounts to their lawful owners. A national refer-
endum to determine the future of the pension system has also been requested (Reyes,
2016).
According to the NoþAFPs’ founder, Luis Messina, the organisation was created in
2013 as a response to a government report which highlighted the very low value of an
average pension. The movement’s basic strategy has been to organise massive protests in
the streets of Santiago and other major cities. The strength of the movement was shown
in August 2016 when over 100,000 people gathered in Santiago, while over 50,000
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people took to the streets in Concepción. The Santiago march ended with an event,
which, according to its organisers, brought about 350,000 people. The Chilean police
estimated the number at about 80,000 (Ayala et al., 2016). The main outcome of the
mobilisations was to force a public conversation about the low value of the AFPs’
pensions and about poverty among the retirees. The administration responded by
scheduling a meeting between Luis Mesina and the Ministers of Labor and Finance.
However, public disputes between the Ministers of Labor and Finance complicated the
process and the proposed reforms had to wait. In response to the lack of progress in this
area, the movement called for the formation of popular assemblies (cabildos) to discuss
and elaborate a new pension system that replaces the AFPs (NoþAFP, 2018).
The End of the Bachelet Administration: Much Ado About
Nothing [ . . . ]
In April 2017, President Bachelet announced a reform bill that would include a 5 per cent
increase in the monthly contributions to be paid by the employer. The additional con-
tribution was to be divided in two: 3 per cent was to be deposited in the employee’s
savings account and 2 per cent was designed to go to a new Common Fund or Collective
Savings Insurance (Seguro de Ahorro Colectivo) that would increase the lowest pen-
sions. The new fund was to be administered by a public, autonomous entity modelled
after the Central Bank. According to the proposed bill, the affiliates would participate in
the investment policies and would have a quota of board members in the AFPs, while
new regulations would make the administrative charges proportional to the return
obtained by the savings accounts. Additionally, the maximum taxable wage would
increase from about CLP $2 million to about $3 million pesos over a period of eight
years. The president concluded by arguing that the proposed reforms would increase
current old age pensions by 20 per cent and that future pensions would increase by about
50 per cent (El Mercurio, 2017).
As expected, the proposal was criticised by a variety of economic and political actors.
For Andrés Santa Cruz, President of the Association of AFPs, the bill was not designed to
increase the pensions because the additional 5 per cent does not go entirely to the
individual accounts (El Mercurio, 2017). The AFPs also questioned the bill’s con-
stitutionality and threatened to take the issue to the Constitutional Tribunal, while a
number of economists argued that the new tax would have a negative effect on both
employment and wages. Right-wing politicians such as Hernán Larraı́n argued that this
bill was a symbol of the NM’s inability to reach an agreement over the issue (El Mer-
curio, 2017). Luis Mesina argued that the proposal was insufficient, and left-wing
presidential candidate Beatriz Sanchez made a similar statement, both calling for the
implementation of a PAYG system (NoþAFPs, 2017). It is noteworthy that the bill did
not reduce the administrative charges nor introduce any accountability in the AFP’s
actions.
Ultimately, the administration introduced three separate bills to Congress in August
2017. The bills dealt with the additional 5 per cent; new regulations for the AFPs; and the
creation of a state-managed AFP. Congress approved none of them before the end of the
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presidential and congressional term, and the Bachelet administration ended without
having solved the problem.
Conclusions
This article analyses the history of achievements and failures in the area of pension of
reform during Bachelet’s first and second administrations, highlighting the role of the
Executive branch and Congress; the impact of political ideology; and the role of private
actors. The limited pension reform of 2008 very much conforms to our understanding of
the role of the state in seizing a political issue to avoid major social problems, which has
been emphasised by Malloy and Borzutzky in previous studies of Brazil and Chile. As
noted by Alberto Arenas de Mesa in his history of pension reform, during her first
administration, Bachelet was both ideologically and practically inclined to pursue the
reform and convened a Commission to define its scope, but there is no doubt that the
decision to reform had already been made by the President.
The final shape and form of the reform was decided both by the existing policy
legacies and the notion of incremental change and expansion of benefits. However, it
was not only the Executive and the experts both in the commission and in the govern-
ment deciding on the terms of the change, but the private sector also played a substantial
role. Ewig and Kay note, that when analysing postretrenchment policies, because of the
influence of interests groups, “reforms themselves take on ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’
forms rather than wholesale change. Furthermore, by utilizing layering and conversion
[ . . . ] they [the reforms] did so in a manner that cemented, rather than sought to change a
fragmented social policy system”(Ewig and Kay, 2011: 88). This influence is clearly
described by Arenas de Mesa when he argues that
in the final analysis and despite the multicolored world of the PS [Socialist Party] some
advice her [Bachelet] not go against the AFPs because they have become a factual power
and going against them would be similar to Allende’s nationalization of the copper com-
panies. (Arenas de Mesa, 2010: 53)
The result was an expansion of benefits paid by the state while the AFPs continued
accumulating rents from the administrative charges.
In addition, this article argues that to explain policy success and failure it is important
to look at the strength of the executive; the cohesion of the governing coalition; and the
country’s economic performance. Before transferring power to her successor, President
Bachelet could claim that she had ended her first presidential term with the highest
approval rate of any president since the transition to democracy, that she had kept the
Concertación coalition alive and that she had governed in a consensual style. She could
also claim that she had obtained from congress the most important pension reform since
the end of the dictatorship.
The 2008 reform expanded coverage and benefited lower income groups and women
by creating a solidarity pillar to supplement and complement the private pension system;
it also created policies designed to improve women’s pensions. However, because this
reform did nothing to curtail the rent-seeking, predatory behaviour of the private
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administrators, and because replacement rates decreased and the real value of pensions
remained very low, dissatisfaction with the pensions provided by AFPs and the system
they administer continued; demands for further reform increased. Thus, this article also
provides a detailed analysis of the nature of Chile’s pension system and a criticism of its
performance, focusing on the excessive profits gained by the pension fund administrators
and the insufficient pensions received by the retirees.
As Jennifer Pribble affirms, “the Pinochet era pension system had created a legacy of
large coverage gaps and by the early 2000s it had become increasingly clear that the state
would be force to step in to fill those holes” (Pribble, 2013: 175). In this context, the
2008 reform resulted from a variety of factors including electoral competition (Bachelet
had promised the reform during the presidential campaign), a legacy of making marginal
reforms to the system inherited from the dictatorship, the existence of a stable political
coalition, and strong economic performance. Additionally, the ideology and strength of
the governing coalition facilitated the passage of the legislation, and the successful
economic performance secured the monies needed to fund the new benefits. To the
extent that the final bill did not touch the structure of the private system or the AFPs
profits, the private administrators or their right-wing allies did not attack the reform.
The need for pension reform was just as pressing during Bachelet’s second admin-
istration as it had been in the first one; and President Bachelet also formed a commission
which provided her with a detailed analysis of the problems and potential solutions. It
would have been logical to predict that the outcome of this attempt would have been
another limited reform that included even more responsibilities for the state because the
ideology of the coalition that had supported Bachelet had veered further to the left.
Additionally, the social demands for reform were stronger than in the early 2000s, and
there was now a social movement demanding reform.
What changed between the first and the second administration that can help us
understand the failure to achieve the desired reform in 2017? First, the internal dynamics
of the NM, the governing coalition, were very different from the Concertación’s internal
dynamics; and it is clear that the NM’s lack of cohesion endangered the legislative
capacity of the administration. Second, the economic performance of the country was
worse than it had been in the first administration; and with diminished rates of economic
growth, the capacity to reform declined, and the level of societal conflict increased.
Third, the poor economic performance and the lack of political and administrative
cohesion affected Bachelet’s popularity; and with declining popular support, she could
not generate the consensus needed to govern. Additionally, the administration was
plagued by internal disagreement, lack of coordination, changes of high-level personnel,
and accusations of corruption. Bachelet’s inability to face these charges undermined her
governing capacity even further. Here Castiglione’s words help us understand the puzzle
when she argues that the
strong constitutional powers of Chilean presidents are constrained by institutional and
partisan features [ . . . ]. that considerably lessen their chances to advance policy change
[ . . . ] As a result presidents are forced to impose strict discipline within their coalition and to
negotiate with at least a segment of the opposition. (Castiglione, 2012: 266)
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In the final analysis, the failure to reform lies with the incoherent NM and a president
besieged by internal political and economic issues.
Future attempts to reform should include not only the items included in the three bills
belatedly introduced to Congress by the Bachelet administration but should also address
the excessive rents obtained by the AFP administrators because of their impact on the
insufficiency of pensions and the heavy fiscal burden. As noted above, the financial
success of the AFPs is illustrated by the fact that by December of 2018 the AFPs con-
trolled the equivalent of 71.5 per cent of GDP. However, the average monthly pension
for someone who saved in an AFP for ten to fifteen years is only US$350 and for women
it is about half of this amount. The new Piňera administration is studying a set of
parametric reforms and a bill was sent to Congress at the end of 2018.
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Piñera J (1996) Empowering Workers: The Radical Reform of Pensions in Chile. Washington:
Cato Institute. Available at: http://www.commonsensebudapest.com/en/wp-content/uploads/
resources/PineraEn.pdf
Pribble J (2013) Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
228 Journal of Politics in Latin America 11(2)
Reyes C (2016) La historia del movimiento que convocó a miles de chilenos. La Tercera , 26
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